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ABSTRACT

Orin R. Redmond
ATTENTIONAL BIASES AND PTSD SYMPTOMOLOGY IN VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS
2008/2009
Dr. Bonnie Angelone
Master of Arts in Mental Health Counseling and Applied Psychology
While the field of change detection and attentional biases has become an increasingly
popular area of study and much is already known about Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), very little research has been done integrating these two areas. In the present
study, we chose to investigate two types of traumatic experiences prevalent in the college
population, motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) and sexual assaults. The flicker paradigm,
used to measure change detection, was utilized to examine hypersensitivity to
environments with threatening stimuli in individuals whom experienced either of these
traumas. The paradigm monitored reaction times to identifying changes that took place in
scenes involving MVA, suggested sexual aggression, or neutral stimuli. We hypothesized
that those with higher levels of PTSD symptomology would respond faster to changes
that represented their central clinical concern. The data suggested that there was a
significant main effect for interaction between reaction times (RTs) to MVA stimuli and
PTSD symptomology. However, the data did not indicate a significant main effect for
interaction between PTSD symptomology and RTs for sexual aggression stimuli.
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CHAPTER I
Literature Review
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that often develops
as a response in individuals whom experience a life threatening event that is usually
overwhelming and/or terror provoking (McNally, 2006). Such life threatening events
might include involvement in a sexual assault, motor vehicle accident, or other situations
that present a sense of danger to an individual. The two life threatening traumas
mentioned above are the focus of this study due to the high prevalence rates seen in
teenage and young adult populations (college years).
The majority of rape and sexual assault victims are females between the age of 16
and 24 years (Fisher, Daigle, Cullen, & Turner, 2003). It was found that in an upwards of
thirty-five percent of female college students became victim to some form of sexual
offense (Fisher et al., 2003) and as many as twenty percent of college women admitted to
being forced into sexual intercourse (Kaltman, Krupnick, Stockton, Hooper, & Green,
2005). Of these women who were assaulted, a study found that more than forty percent
met the criteria for PTSD even several months after the traumatic experience (Cortina &
Kubiak, 2006). In a different study, researchers found that approximately seventy percent
of women who admitted to being a victim of sexual assault also experienced another
traumatic life event other than the assault (Kaltman et al., 2005).
Other traumatic life threatening events common to this age group are motor
vehicle accidents (MVAs). MVAs are the leading cause of severe injuries among adults

worldwide, accounting for over 3.5 million people injured every year (Kupchik, Strous,
Erez, Gonen, Weizman, & Spivak, 2007). Motor vehicle accidents can also lead to the
onset of a variety of both chronic and acute psychological symptomology and are
considered to be one of the leading causes of acute PTSD in the nation (Jones-Alexander,
Blanchard, & Hickling, 2005).
Individuals whom experience events like motor vehicle accidents or sexual assault
are at risk to develop PTSD symptomology. This symptomology can progress into a
condition of maintaining heightened awareness for any surrounding potential threats in
the environment (Bryant & Harvey, 1995). Sensitivity to such conceivable threats can
provoke anxiety if the individual's attention is drawn to stimuli that hold considerable
perceived significance to the trauma experienced. For example, if a woman was raped
while walking near a dark alley on campus, dark alleys in general could now be
considered potential threats to that woman. A dark alley was an environmental factor at
the time of the rape and could therefore provoke anxiety for that individual if attention is
drawn to a similar alley in the future. Reminding an individual of past trauma can not
only generate thoughts and feelings of reliving the traumatic event with original
emotional intensity (McNally, 2006), but it can also intensify the fear that similar
situations may occur (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The processing of these
thoughts has been found to be automatic and can elicit involuntary retrieval of trauma
memories. The resurfacing, or recovery, of these memories will most often be presented
in the form of intrusive thoughts or images (flashbacks, snap-shots), nightmares, and
avoidance of the threat-stimuli (Cassiday, McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Williams, Mathews,
& MacLeod, 1996). It was found that the lifetime prevalence of this disorder and

symptomology in the United States was as much as twelve percent (Cortina and Kubiak,
2006).
To aid researchers in the understanding of posttraumatic stress disorder, learning
theory can help to explain the etiology and maintenance of symptoms found in PTSD.
Learning theory consists of two components to the development of PTSD, classical
conditioning and operant conditioning. Classical conditioning is used to illustrate the
high levels of distress and fear exhibited by individuals that have experienced a trauma
(Resick & Calhoun, 2001). Individuals whom experience a trauma may associate that
event with other stimuli in the environment at the time. This association can occur when
an individual unconsciously links a visual cue with a traumatic event. This may result in
the individual experiencing fear and anxiety toward these other neutral environmental
stimuli. For example, as mentioned earlier, if a woman was raped near a particular
building on a college campus, the associated anxiety and arousal may be provoked by
walking near any building. The individual might then interpret the anxiety with a greater
risk of possibly being raped again if she were to walk near that building or a similar one.
Operant conditioning can also be used to explain avoidance behaviors and the
maintenance of fear (Resick & Calhoun, 2001). Triggers (e.g. Buildings, in the case of
the above mentioned example) are avoided to reduce anxiety and the fear of reoccurrence
of the traumatic event. When thoughts and feelings of the event and emotions of reliving
the trauma become overwhelming, certain defense mechanisms are manifested, such as
avoidance or numbing. These defense mechanisms are used to help individuals cope with
stress. By avoiding a trigger and removing the threat stimuli, fear and anxiety levels will
decrease, therefore reinforcing this behavior. This response is known as negative

reinforcement. Without confronting the threat-stimuli, the victim of trauma will never
have the opportunity to deduce that not every encounter with threatening stimuli will
result in a traumatic episode (Resick & Calhoun, 2001).
The way emotional information is processed is critical to the study of etiology,
maintenance of symptoms, and treatment for PTSD (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling,
2002). The processing of information is directed by beliefs, or schemas, already
possessed by the individual, that determine how incoming experiences are received,
interpreted, and stored into memory (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, BakermansKranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2007). There are three stages of cognitive processing,
otherwise referred to as information processing (IP), in individuals with anxiety
disorders. In the first stage of IP, stimuli are attended to without conscious awareness.
This stage is involuntary and requires very little attention. For an individual with anxiety,
although the processing is automatic, they may still have sensitivity to stimuli associated
with the trauma. These stimuli are called stimuli with a negative valence, which means
they have negative emotional arousing tendencies for the individual and are seen as
threat-stimuli to that person in that specific situation. Not every individual with an
anxiety disorder will have the same negative valence stimuli. In most cases, the negative
valence stimuli are specific to that individual's trauma. The second stage of information
processing is considered the activation stage. During this stage, an individual's attention
is directed towards the threatening stimuli. During the third stage, specific concerns
become the primary focus of the thought processes and the person must decide if they are
in fact capable of coping with the arising situation. It is in these last two stages that
attention is drawn to environmental stimuli that are of central concern to that individual's
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beliefs and memories of the trauma (Beck & Clark, 1997). This initial reaction of
directing one's attention to specific stimuli is known as a bias.
A core characteristic in persons with PTSD is a bias towards threatening
environmental stimuli related to a traumatic event. This bias is formed by cognitive
representations of several emotions (fear, shame, anger, guilt, etc.) that activate anxiety,
warning the individual of a possible threat (Bryant & Harvey, 1995). In addition, biases
can contribute to the increase of anxiety in people with PTSD and encourage avoidance
behavior leading to the maintenance of the symptoms. In early stages of information
processing, individuals with PTSD direct their focus toward the threatening stimuli and in
later stages they direct their focus away from the stimuli. At first, the individual shows
an automatic, involuntary bias towards threat-related information and once the thought
process recognizes the possible danger, avoidance becomes a mechanism to relieve
anxiety. Therefore, a bias is a contributing factor in the manifestation of avoidance
behavior (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
The term bias can be defined in several ways. Bias is a marked difference seen in
the focus on threat-related stimuli versus neutral stimuli of individuals demonstrating
high anxiety. In this definition, the researchers looked for a difference in attentional focus
to threat and non-threat stimuli in anxious individuals. A bias is also a marked difference
seen in the demonstration of focus between threat-related and neutral stimuli in
individuals with anxiety compared to the focus between threat-related and neutral stimuli
in those without anxiety. The second definition concentrates on a comparison of
attentional focus on threat and non-threat stimuli between the anxious and non-anxious
individuals. Since the threat-related stimuli should not represent negative valence for

non-anxious individuals, there should be no difference between reactions to threat-related
and neutral stimuli for that group. If there is a difference in observed results when
comparing the two groups' reactions to threat or non-threat related stimuli, evidence of a
bias is present (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
People create these biases, or beliefs, according to their focus of attention and
memory of traumatic accounts and the associated environments (Resick & Calhoun,
2001). Despite the fact that the world and environment are filled with stimuli, both
threatening and non-threatening, people tend to absorb minimal characterizing
information. However, the characterizing information collected is usually just enough for
automatic labeling to take place (Simons, 1996). During this automatic labeling,
information is taken from representative snap-shots of a scene or object. This
representation is usually unsatisfactory since the image tends to deteriorate almost
immediately after attention is disengaged (Hollingworth, 2003). During the labeling
phase, attention is executed in the form of a "priority map." For example, objects that are
of central concern to the individual will be examined in more detail (Yantis & Hillstrom,
1994). This presents the idea that attention plays an important role in information
processing.
Attention is defined as the adjustment in the rate and significance of information
processing which causes a change in the priority of the information being processed
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Normally, attention changes according to
priority of incoming information, or bias, and may be directed to or away from a specific
stimulus due to this attentional bias. Attentional bias causes interference and delay in
information processing because attention is diverted to a particular stimulus rather than
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the previously attended object. This is recognized as being largely involuntary (Constans,
2005). Attentional bias caused by threat stimuli is particularly pronounced in individuals
with PTSD compared with other anxiety disorders. One reason for this may be due to a
plethora of well-established trauma related thought processes (Bryant & Harvey, 1997).
Attentional biases play a significant role in the development and perpetuation of PTSD
symptomology. The focus on mild threats can lead to concern over harmless stimuli and
cause a condition of"high alert," or elevated stress risk (Constans, 2005).
There are two paradigms that have been consistently used for the study of
information processing and attentional biases in anxiety disorders, the emotional stroop
task paradigm and the dot-probe paradigm. The emotional stroop task paradigm is a
design that presents both threatening and non-threat related words to the participant, in
which each word is printed in different ink colors. Participants identify the color of the
word rather than the physical meaning of the word itself (Jones, Jones, Smith, & Copley,
2003; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Constans, 2005). Bruce and Jones (2004) found that if the
content of the word was related to the individuals' concerns, color naming response time
was delayed compared to color naming for neutral stimuli. Bryant and Harvey (1995)
actually found the stronger the stimulus, the slower the response. Other studies have
resulted in a similar attentional bias with the emotional stroop task paradigm in alcohol
users (Bruce & Jones, 2004; Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001), nicotine users (Waters &
Feyerabend, 2000), heroin dependence (Franken, Kroon, Wiers, & Jansen, 2000), bulimia
nervosa (Fairburn, Cooper, Cooper, McKenna, & Anastasiades, 1991), and rape victims
with PTSD (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002).

The other paradigm used for measuring attentional biases is the dot-probe
paradigm. In this design, two stimuli (one threat word and one non-threat word) are
presented to participants for a brief period of time. They are then covered with a mask
(blank screen), and are shortly followed by a small visual probe in the location of one of
the previously displayed words. The participants are then responsible for naming the
word replaced with the probe (Bar-Haim, 2007; Constans, 2005). Studies have resulted
in an inconsistent reliability and found a lack of attentional bias, when using the dotprobe paradigm, for strong threat words (Bryant & Harvey, 1997). Although there is a
lack of reliability and literature using these paradigms for the study of PTSD, it was
found that when attentional biases were present with other symptomology, participants
displayed slower reaction times to the stimuli for the emotional stroop task paradigm and
faster reaction times to related stimuli when using the dot-probe paradigm.
Using the emotional stroop task paradigm or dot-probe paradigm to study
attentional biases may be somewhat problematic (Jones, Jones, Smith, & Copley, 2002).
There is little evidence that can be used to determine whether these paradigms measure
attention selection early during the processing of stimuli or if the biases are related to the
same response criterion later during processing (Jones, Jones, Smith, & Copley, 2002).
Due to this finding, researchers have borrowed a paradigm from the visual cognition
literature to measure attention selection and change blindness. The flicker paradigm is
often used to measure change blindness, which refers to the failure of detection of large
or significant changes in a scene (Simons & Levin, 1997; Simons & Rensink, 2005; Cole,
Kentridge, & Lleywood, 2004). Change blindness is observed if the participants lack the
ability to recognize a change that takes place in a scene. The flicker paradigm is a method

8

in which two almost identical images are presented to participants with one object
changed in one of the images. After the first image (pre-change) is briefly presented, it is
then covered with a mask (blank screen). Shortly following the blank screen, the second
image (post-change) is briefly shown. The second image is then covered with a mask and
is followed by the presentation of the original pre-change image. This process will
continue to "flicker" until the observer detects the change occurring between the two
scenes (Rensink, O'Regan & Clark, 1997; Jones, Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006) or
until the designated time period for the task expires. This paradigm relies on the
individual's ability to encode, store, and recall information in the memory from the initial
scene. In addition, observers must compare the initial and changed images in order to
detect the change. (Angelone, Levin, & Simons, 2003; Mitroff, Simons, & Franconeri,
2002).
In the current study, we investigated PTSD symptomology in individuals who
have experienced either a motor vehicle accident or been a victim of sexual aggression
and examined attentional biases using the flicker paradigm. The purpose of this study is
to find an effective tool that can be used to measure attentional biases associated with
individuals affected by either of these traumas. With this information, clinicians can use
this tool to gain insight into their client's tendencies toward attentional biases.
Knowledge of these biases can help explain self-maintaining of symptomology and the
occurrence of relapse after what is usually considered to be successful treatment (Jones,
Bruce, Smith, & Copley, 2002). For example, if researchers were able to gain
understanding behind avoidance behavior and these biases, they would be better equipped
with the insight needed to develop specific relapse prevention techniques designed to
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confront these threat-related stimuli. With awareness of these stimuli, victims of trauma
could be better prepared to apply a variety of coping strategies to a situation for anxiety
reduction.
Using the flicker paradigm is optimal because the stimuli are more realistic,
lifelike, and natural. Since visual flashbacks are the most common of reliving
experiences in individuals with PTSD (McNally, 2006), the pictures used in a flicker
paradigm will allow for personal interpretation of a scene rather than have one word
specifically targeted at one object with each presentation as with the stroop or dot-probe
paradigms. Flicker paradigm has been used to examine attentional bias (faster response
time to threat related stimuli compared to neutral stimuli) in problem drinkers (Jones,
Bruce, Livingstone, & Reed, 2006), individuals with insomnia (Marchetti, Biello,
Broomfield, MacMahon, & Espie, 2006), poor sleepers (Jones et al., 2005), and alcohol
users and cannabis users (Jones, Jones, Blundell, & Bruce, 2002). It has been found that
information processing biases exist in alcohol users, not just abusers and dependents
(Jones, Bruce, Smith, & Copley, 2002). This poses the idea that there may be attentional
biases, and information processing biases, in individuals with PTSD symptoms, not just
those diagnosed with PTSD. If this is true, the information learned from studying PTSD
with the flicker paradigm can be used to help individuals that share symptoms common to
that of PTSD. Victims of rape and sexual assault with symptoms similar to that of PTSD,
that had moved, avoided thinking about the assault, or changed jobs to remove
themselves from reminders of the rape most likely did not develop PTSD (Cassiday,
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992). If individuals could have an effective measure to help
pinpoint these affentional biases, working on stress reduction with these targeted stimuli
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might benefit the individual and aid them in decreasing their chances of symptoms
evolving into an anxiety disorder, such as PTSD.
In this study, participants were asked to view scenes containing one object change
and determine whether or not they detect that change. Images presented were several
pictures of natural scenes, some involving neutral stimuli while others were specific to
motor vehicle accidents or sexual aggression (assault and rape). Individuals with PTSD
symptomology can, at times, be hypersensitive to their surroundings and will attend to
change anywhere in the visual field as long as there is something in the scene relevant to
that individual's center of concern. This led to both of our hypotheses. We hypothesized
that, within individuals whom have experienced a motor vehicle accident, those with
higher levels of PTSD symptomology would respond faster to clinical concern threatrelated stimuli than neutral stimuli compared to individuals with lower levels of PTSD
symptomology. We also hypothesize that within individuals whom have experienced a
trauma related to sexual aggression, those with higher levels of PTSD symptomology
would respond faster to clinical concern threat-related stimuli than neutral stimuli
compared to individuals with lower levels of PTSD symptomology.
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CHAPTER II
Method
Participants
Participants were comprised of 375 volunteers recruited through the Introduction
to Psychology subject pool in the psychology department at a moderate sized university
in the northeastern portion of the United States. Participants were required to have normal
or corrected-to-normal vision to partake in the study. They ranged in age from 18 to 49
years. Participants identified themselves as Caucasian/White American (n =300) and
Ethnic Minority/Non-White (n=75). Overall, 48.8% of the sample was male (n = 183)
and 51.2% was female (n = 192).

Materials
Stimuli
A flicker paradigm was used to display three different types of realistic/natural
scene stimuli. These three types of stimuli involved motor vehicle accidents, suggested
sexual assault, and neutral scenes. Motor vehicle accident stimuli, contained pictures of
actual accidents (both fatal and non-fatal) as well as pictures of rescue workers and
roadside memorials (see figure 1 for an example). The images in the suggested sexual
assault category included pictures such as men physically assaulting women (i.e. men
holding women's wrist or images suggesting women being battered), sexual harassment
at the workplace, contraceptives, and women being held against their will at knife-point
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(see figure 2 for an example). Images in the neutral category consisted of bedroom
scenes, living room and kitchen scenes, pictures of food, pictures of animals, and other
daily life images (see figure 3 for an example). The pictures presented included images
both with and without people present.
Changes were created using Photoshop to add or delete objects, move the location
of an object, or change the characteristics of an object. Although original pictures were
labeled pre-change and altered images were labeled post-change, when shown in the
flicker paradigm, the post-change image were sometimes shown first, in order so that the
unaltered image was sometimes the pre-change and sometimes the post-change. In total
there were four different types of changes made: addition, deletion, location and object
characteristic. An example of a deletion/addition in the sexual aggression category was
the removal of the Trojan helmet on a condom wrapper. An example of an addition in the
MVA category was duplicating a rescue worker at the location of the accident and
placing him on the other side of the scene. An example of a change in location of an
object in a neutral scene was moving a stuffed animal from one side of the bed to the
other. Finally, object characteristic changes consisted of changes to some property of an
object such as a change to the part of an object, size or color of an object or other changes
that were not addition, deletion or location. For example, an individual's hair was
expanded and made longer in the post-change scene. When location or characteristics
were changed or when an object was added, the changes were made to threat stimuli
(MVA and sexual aggression scenes) and neutral stimuli change was made in the center
of the image or to the assumed central concern of the image to avoid differences in scene
detection difficulty. Although we did not have a measure to determine the central concern
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of each scene, experimenters attempted to change what they thought were the greatest
threat concerns (main objects in each scene). Images were retrieved from copyright free
websites such as morquefile.com and freephotol .com. They were also borrowed from a
picture archive program, International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 2005), as well as some scenes were also provided by the researchers and
assistants of this study.
Stimuli were presented using Direct RT v2004.3.0.24 on 15 inch monitors set at a
resolution of 600 x 400 controlled by Dell Intel Pentium 4 computers. Participants sat at
an approximate distance of 50cm from the computer screens with the keyboard directly in
front of the monitors on a desk. The majority of scenes (array on grey background or
picture) were 24

'/2

x 18

cm presented at the center of a 30 x 23cm screen and

subtended a 26 ° horizontal visual angle. The original and edited images were presented
for 333 milliseconds (ms) each with a blank grey screen in between that was presented
for 130ms. This procedure repeated for as long as 60 seconds total or until the change
was detected and the flicker was stopped, triggered by the participant touching the space
bar on the keyboard (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Reaction times were recorded once the
space bar of the computer keyboard was pressed. The programs used to administer the
flicker paradigm and questionnaires were Media Lab and Direct RT.
Measures
Post-traumaticStress Disorder Check List (PCL-C). This is a 17 item self-report
measure that uses a five point Likert scale to assess PTSD symptomology in individuals
who may have experienced trauma. Participants were asked to rate how much they were
bothered by certain problems in the last few months and report the intensity using the
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Likert scale (1 - "not at all" to 5 - "extremely"). Examples of questions asked were, "Do
you have repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of a stressful experience
from the past?" or "Do you avoid activities or situations because they reminded you of a
stressful experience from the past?" (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993).
Trauma History Screen (THS). This is a self-report measure that inquires about
several different traumatic experiences one may have encountered. This measure asks for
age at the time of the event, descriptions of the account, and other questions dealing with
the physical and emotional well-being of the victim and others involved. This measure is
a basic questionnaire used for finding victimization rates of different traumatic
experiences in a surveyed population. Examples of questions asked were, "Have you ever
been in a really bad car, boat, train, or airplane accident?" or "Have you ever been forced
or made to have sexual contact as an adult?" If the participant answered yes to any of the
initial questions, they then received a follow up question such as, "When this happened,
were you afraid that you or someone else might get hurt or killed?" (Carlson, Palmiere,
Kimerling, Ruzek, & Burling, Unpublished manuscript)
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). This is a 21 item self-report measure that uses a
four point Likert scale to assess an individual's feelings of oneself. Ratings of zero being
the least severe and three being most severe, the BDI focuses on feelings of depression
and self-worth of an individual. A total score of 0-13 is viewed as minimal range, 14-19
is mild, 20-28 is moderate, and 29-63 is considered a severe range for depression. The
BDI is one of the most widely used scales in evaluating depression in an individual.
Examples of statements made were, "0 - I do not feel like a failure; 1 - I feel I have

15

failed more than the average person; 2 - As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of
failure; 4- Ifeel I am a complete failure as a person" (Beck, Ward, & Mendelson, 1961).

Procedure
This research was conducted in small groups ranging from 1-10 people.
Participants viewed stimuli and completed surveys on individual computers. First,
participants were asked to sign informed consent for their involvement with the study.
During this time, an experimenter briefly explained that the participants would be asked
to answer potentially sensitive questions and they will be seeing images that may be
considered graphic. Participants were informed that they are volunteers and may leave at
any time if they felt uncomfortable. Prior to completing several surveys, participants
viewed 60 pairs of near identical scenes on the computer in which one object changed in
each set. Since this project was a part of a larger experiment, only 30 pairs of stimuli
were used for analyses. Participants' were to detect the change as quickly as possible and
to trigger the space bar once they had found the change. After the participant recognized
the changed and stopped the flicker, they were to write down the name of the object in
the scene that changed and how it changed on a provided answer key. Each computer
station had individual wall dividers which prevented any external distractions from
interfering with the participants' performance and observation. Their reaction time and
answer accuracy were recorded and analyzed.
After the participants completed the change detection portion of the study, they
were asked to complete several surveys. These measures included the PTSD checklist
(PCL), Trauma History Screen (THS), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and a
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demographics questionnaire. Once the measures were completed, participants were
excused and subsequently left the room in order to reduce distractibility of other
participants engaged in the study. These participants were fully debriefed upon
dismissal.
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CHAPTER III
Results
MVA Analysis
There were a total of 81 participants who endorsed being involved in a serious
MVA. A mixed ANOVA with one between groups variable (level of PTSD
symptomology: high and low) and one within groups variable (type of stimuli viewed:
related and neutral) was conducted. To examine PTSD symptomology, participant PCL
scores were divided into two categories: Low (35 and less) and High (36 and greater).
There was no main effect for stimuli type (F(1,79) = .034, p = .854, partial 12 =
.000). The main effect of PTSD symptomology was also not found to be significant
(F(1,79) = .833, p = .364, partial 1 2 = .010). However, the stimuli type by PTSD

symptomology interaction was significant (F(1,79) = 4.129, p = .046, partial 112= .050).
Individuals with higher levels of symptomology demonstrated faster reaction times to
related stimuli (M = 8706.47, SD = 4910.89) compared to neutral stimuli (M = 9483.71,

SD = 5676.51). Individuals with lower symptomology were similar for both related (M =
10679.10, SD = 6763.59) and neutral stimuli (M = 10031.71, SD = 6352.07). See Table

1.
Sexual Aggression Analysis
There were a total of 33 participants who endorsed being sexually assaulted either
as a child or an adult. For all 375 participants in the study, reaction time for sexual
assault and neutral pictures was significantly different (t(374) = 10.45, p<.05). As such,
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we use a z-score transformation to equalize reaction times used in our comparisons. A
mixed ANOVA with one between groups variable (level of PTSD symptomology: high
and low) and one within groups variable (type of stimuli viewed: related and neutral) was
conducted on these transformed scores. There was no main effect for stimuli type
(F(1,31) = 1.368, p = .251, partial 12 = .042). The main effect of PTSD symptomology
was also not found to be significant (F(1,31) = .171, p = .682, partial 12 = .005). Finally,

the stimuli type by PTSD symptomology interaction was not significant (F(1,31) = .078,
p = .781, partial 12 = .003). Individuals with high symptomology performed similarly on
related and neutral images (M = .3561, SD = 1.41; M = .5464, SD = 1.71, respectively).

Individuals with low symptomology also performed similarly on related and neutral
images (M = .1718, SD = 1.40; M = .2886, SD = 1.70, respectively). See Table 2.
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CHAPTER IV
Discussion
The study examined the interaction between reaction time to detect changes and
level of PTSD symptomology in individuals who have experienced a trauma (either
sexual aggression or a MVA). It was predicted that those with higher PTSD
symptomology and a traumatic experience would react quicker to changes in scenes that
were representative to that individual's clinical concerns, than would those with lower
levels of PTSD symptomology and a related experience.
Our first hypothesis, that individuals, whom have experienced a motor vehicle
accident and had higher levels of PTSD symptomology, would respond faster to clinical
concern threat-related stimuli than neutral stimuli compared to individuals with lower
levels of PTSD symptomology was supported. Individuals whom experienced a motor
vehicle accident and had higher levels of PTSD symptomology responded faster to MVA
stimuli than neutral stimuli compared to those whom had experienced a motor vehicle
accident and had lower levels of PTSD symptomology. We also hypothesized that within
individuals whom have experienced a trauma related to sexual aggression, those with
higher levels of PTSD symptomology would respond faster to clinical concern threatrelated stimuli than neutral stimuli compared to individuals with lower levels of PTSD
symptomology. This hypothesis was not supported.
Because existing literature on this topic is very limited, it is difficult to establish a
well defined explanation for why those with higher levels of PTSD symptomology
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responded slower on sexual aggression stimuli than those with lower levels of
symptomology and not for MVA stimuli when using the flicker paradigm. One
possibility is comorbid depression. As stated previously, past research supports the
finding that PTSD and depression are strongly related (Orr, Claiborn, Altman, Forgue, de
Jong, Pitman, & Herz, 1990) and can have an effect on the performance of an individual
during a change detection task. It has also been found that attentional biases no longer
exist when anxiety and depression coexist (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Buckley, Blanchard, &
Hickling, 2002). Comorbid depression can delay a person's response time for a number
of reasons. Although we used a depression scale in this study, we had very few
individuals reporting unwanted sexual experiences, and we did not have many individuals
experiencing high levels of PTSD symptomology. We were not able to determine
whether depression played a role in the current study; in the future the effects of
depression could be examined in more depth.
One theory explaining the effect of comorbid depression involves emotional
numbing. Emotional numbing can occur over time when an individual whom experienced
a trauma avoids environmental or experiential stimuli that would otherwise remind him
or her of the trauma itself. After reducing exposure to the threat stimuli and anxiety
provoking situations, trauma victims can train themselves to suppress emotions
associated with their traumatic experience. Therefore, when the individual eventually
does encounter what might have once been threatening stimuli, the object or situation no
longer provokes anxiety because emotional numbing has taken place (Litz, Schlenger,
Weathers, Caddell, Fairbank, & LaVange, 1997). If participants whom experienced a
motor vehicle accident or a sexual trauma used emotional numbing during the flicker
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paradigm in the present study, reaction times would be affected and no attentional bias
would have been found.
Another potential explanation for slower reaction times in those with higher levels
of PTSD symptomology is that the scene stimuli chosen for this study might not have
been representative of traumatic stimuli for those individuals that experienced sexual
aggression. Stimuli used may not have been graphic enough to provoke feelings of
anxiety or thoughts of reliving the trauma once experienced by that individual. It is also
possible that those scenes were not specific to the traumas experienced, therefore making
it difficult for individuals to connect there anxiety with the "threat-related" images.
A third possible explanation for slower reaction times might have been the type of
trauma that caused higher levels of PTSD symptomology were not relevant to those being
studied. For example, if someone was sexually assaulted by a family member as a child,
stimuli of a woman being attacked at knife point might not provoke the same anxiety as
would a picture of a child being assaulted or a picture of that person's relative. It is also
possible that an individual experienced more than one traumatic event. Although some of
the participants had more severe symptomology than others, it is not guaranteed that their
involvement in a motor vehicle accident or an unwanted sexual experience was the cause
of that symptomology. It is assumed that if the elevated PCL scores were in fact caused
by another trauma, the threat-related scene stimuli chosen might not be of clinical
concern to those participants.
Finally, it is a possibility that as found when using the emotional stroop paradigm,
individuals with anxiety disorders exhibit a delay when confronted by stimuli that are of
clinical concern to that individual. Those researchers that used the emotional stroop
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paradigm discovered a "surprise" effect experienced by participants. This explains that
when clinical concern stimuli were presented to each individual, he or she was surprised
by the physical meaning of the word and therefore caused a delay in response time to
color name that stimuli (Bruce & Jones, 2004; Sharma, Albery, & Cook, 2001; Waters &
Feyerabend, 2000; Franken, Kroon, Wiers, & Jansen, 2000; Fairburn, Cooper, Cooper,
McKenna, & Anastasiades, 1991; Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002). Since flicker
paradigm had never been used prior to this study to investigate attentional biases in
individuals with PTSD, it is difficult to determine if life-like scene stimuli would cause
participants to experience that same "surprise" effect and result in a delayed response (in
the case of the sexual assault stimuli).
Evidence of cues to emotional triggers was only supported by the findings for one
of the two stimuli categories. However, this could be due in part to some methodological
limitations. One of the methodological limitations in the present study was a possible
misrepresentation of trauma related stimuli. There was no rating scale used to measure if
the scenes chosen did in fact provoke anxiety for those whom experienced either a motor
vehicle accident or some form of sexual aggression. Although threatening stimuli for
individuals whom experienced a trauma can often be specific to the traumatic experience,
scene stimuli allow for personal interpretation. The stimuli chosen for this study might
have been too specific, therefore not allowing for much personal interpretation. A
difficulty scale would have also been beneficial to measure the rigor of change taking
place in each scene. Without this scale, there was no way of determining whether or not
one category was more difficult than the other or even whether one picture change was
harder than others in that same group.
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Another limitation of the present study was a non-diverse sample population. Out
of 375 participants, 81 students admitted to being in a severe motor vehicle accident, but
only 33 participants admitted to having an unwanted sexual experience. According to
prior research, around 20-25% of female college students fall victim to some form of
sexual assault and an estimated 70% of female college students have reported being
exposed to sexual harassment by their male counterparts (Mitchell, Angelone, &
Hirschman, 2006). Findings from the present study reported less than ten percent of
college women experienced a sexual trauma. There are a few possible reasons for these
findings. One explanation could in fact be a lack of sexual trauma in the sample
population. Another reason could be an unwillingness to report such trauma, possibly
from embarrassment, shame, anger, or any other emotion that would cause an individual
to resent themselves or their involvement in the experience. One more possibility for a
low number of participants disclosing unwanted sexual experiences could be the use of a
questionnaire that assessed only basic sexual experiences rather than various unwanted
sexual traumas. The Sexual Experiences Survey or an equivalent measure would have
been an ideal measure to assess unwanted sexual experiences because it covers a series of
detailed unwanted sexual events from petting, fondling to being coerced into sex by a
significant other. Experiences listed in the measure progressively get more detailed and
violent essentially ending with being forced into sexual intercourse by use of a weapon
(Koss & Gidycz, 1985). The questions asked of our participants in the Trauma History
Screen were, "Have you ever been forced or made to have sexual contact as a child?" and
"Have you ever been forced or made to have sexual contact as an adult?" Some
participants in the current study might have read these questions and only considered
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unwanted experiences involving intercourse, not getting the full sample wanted for those
that experienced an unwanted sexual trauma.
A similar problem arose with the question for MVA. The question asked of our
participants using the Trauma History Screen was, "Have you ever been in a really bad
car, boat, train, or airplane accident?" Participants were not given a detailed definition of
"really bad" car, boat, train, or airplane accident. For one individual, a "really bad"
accident might have meant someone died, while for another participant that same term
might have been interpreted as the vehicle needed body work afterwards. This could
present as obstacle because it is not certain how either experience would affect PTSD
symptomology. This question also grouped automobile, plane, boat, and train accidents in
one category. Although researchers did review descriptions to pick out the motor vehicle
accidents, participants were not always clear with the type of accident he or she
experienced. Researchers did their best to decipher what type of accident was
experienced from the description given by the participant and would then label that data
with the appropriate accident type.
While this study broke new ground being the first to look at attentional biases in
individuals with PTSD symptomology using a flicker paradigm, there is still much work
and improvements to be made. It is necessary to study these biases in hope to find a
treatment that can be used with aiding PTSD victims in learning positive coping
mechanisms and strategies.
There is a lack of literature on this topic particularly that which relates to specific
areas of study such as motor vehicle accidents and sexual assault. Recommendations for
future research would be to investigate other factors that might also contribute to
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attentional biases in individuals with PTSD. One way is to create stimuli that are
representative of traumatic experiences being studied by developing a rating scale that
can be used as an initial measure to determine if the stimuli are too specific or not
detailed enough. A measure of change detection difficulty should also be employed. It
would not be beneficial to researchers if some stimuli in a group were very easy while
others were greater in difficulty.
In summary, the current study investigated attentional biases and PTSD
symptomology in individuals who have experienced sexual assault or a MVA using the
flick change blindness paradigm. Individuals who experienced a MVA detected changes
faster in stimuli of accidents compared to neutral stimuli. There was no difference in
change detection for different stimuli for individuals who experienced sexual assault.
Future research should focus on using questionnaires that would provide a more accurate
portrayal of sexual experiences. In addition, it was difficult to know in the current study
whether the images provoked anxiety specific to people's trauma (in the case of the
sexual assault stimuli).
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TABLE 1
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TABLE 2
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APPENDIX A
Figure Descriptions
Figure 1. This is an example of the stimuli used in the motor vehicle accident category. A
starting screen appeared (grey screen with a little white cross in the center) and as soon as
participants were ready they activated the flicker. The pre change image flashed for 333
ms, followed by a grey screen for 130 ms, then the post change scene for 333 ms, and
finally another grey screen for 130 ms. This repeated for as long as 60 seconds or until
the changed image was noticed. In this scene, a rescue worker appears in the lower right
hand corner of the picture.
Figure 2. This is an example of the stimuli used in the suggested sexual aggression
category. A starting screen appeared (grey screen with a little white cross in the center)
and as soon as participants were ready they activated the flicker. The pre change image
flashed for 333 ms, followed by a grey screen for 130 mns, then the post change scene for
333 ms, and finally another grey screen for 130 ms. This repeated for as long as 60
seconds or until the changed image was noticed. In this scene, the girl's necklace
disappears and reappears.
Figure 3. This is an example of the stimuli used in the suggested sexual aggression
category. A starting screen appeared (grey screen with a little white cross in the center)
and as soon as participants were ready they activated the flicker. The pre change image
flashed for 333 ms, followed by a grey screen for 130 ms, then the post change scene for
333 ms, and finally another grey screen for 130 ms. This repeated for as long as 60
seconds or until the changed image was noticed. In this scene, the skydiver changes from
being joined in the circle formation and to letting go and leaving the circle (top right
corner).
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APPENDIX B

Table Descriptions
Table 1. This graph illustrates the mean reaction times for MVA and Neutral Stimuli,
while considering PCL scores as a variable of main effect. On the Y-axis, time to detect
changes was measured in milliseconds. The categories for severity of PTSD
symptomology are on the X-axis (High and Low).
Table 2. This graph illustrates the mean reaction times for Sexual Aggression and
Neutral Stimuli, while also considering PCL scores as a variable of main effect. Z-score
transformations of the mean for change detection are located on the Y-axis. The
categories for severity of symptomology are on the X-axis (High and Low).
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